The membership in non-militant Islamic groups operating in Kyrgyzstan has also been overwhelmingly Uzbek (ICG, 2003a; Rotar, 2006) . Hizb ut-Hahrir, for example, has been very active in the Ferghana Valley as well as in the southern Osh, Batken, and JalalAbad provinces of Kyrgyzstan where the Uzbek minority is concentrated (Botobekov, 2001: 132) . The Kyrgyz security sources claim that Uzbeks constitute up to 90 percent of the membership of Hizb ut-Hahrir, while ethnic Kyrgyz make up three to four percent (ICG, 2003a: 18) . In fact, almost all members of Hizb ut-Tahrir arrested in Kyrgyzstan have been ethnic Uzbeks, and nearly all Islamic clerics implicated in collaboration with banned religious groups have been of Uzbek origin (Karagiannis, 2005, 141) .
Since the end of the civil war in 1997, Tajikistan has experienced a surge of militant attacks most of which were blamed on the IMU. The Tajik government claims that the IMU operatives are ethnic Uzbeks who crossed into Tajikistan from Uzbekistan fleeing prosecution by the Uzbek government in the aftermath of the 1999 terrorist bombings in Tashkent (Kimmage, 2006; Naumkin, 2005: 166) . Hizb ut-Tahrir in Tajikistan is also heavily ethnic Uzbek with the majority of followers concentrated in the northern Sugd (former Leninabad) province, where Tajikistan's Uzbek minority is primarily based. Some ethnic Tajiks have also been drawn to the group. However, the movement's core constituency remains predominantly Uzbek (ICG, 2004; Naumkin, 2005: 166) .
The growing radicalization of Islam in Kazakhstan has also occurred mostly among ethnic Uzbeks. The radical Hizb ut-Tahrir has been active in the southern Shymkent oblast bordering Uzbekistan. The Kazakh authorities deny the existence of home-grown terrorists and religious extremists maintaining that Islamists infiltrated Omelicheva, Mariya Y. Ethnic Dimension of Religious Extremism and Terrorism in Central Asia, International Political Science Review, 2010 31(2): 167-186. Publisher's Official Version: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0192512110364738>. Open Access Version: <http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/>.
Kazakhstan's southern regions from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Russia. Public reports released by the Kazakh security services and court rulings recounted by the international human rights groups also refer to the Uzbek fellowship of the radical Islamic groups in Kazakhstan.
In Uzbekistan, as in other Central Asian states, Hizb ut-Tahrir derives its largest following from ethnic Uzbeks. The cities of Namangan, Kasansai, and Andijan located in the Uzbek part of the Ferghana valley are considered to be the stronghold of radical Islam in Central Asia. However, radical Islamic groups also enjoy wide support among ethnic Tajiks in Uzbekistan, according to findings of the field researchers and the background information on the arrested Hizb ut-Tahrir members (Ahmedova and Leitich, 2001) .
Little information about radical Islamic groups in Turkmenistan leaks to the outside world due to the total secrecy of the regime established by late President Niyazov. Some analysts contend that no Islamists could escape the reach of the powerful repressive apparatus of the Turkmen government. Other regional specialists maintain that radical Islamic groups operate underground in Turkmenistan. Hizb ut-Tahrir, for example, has been active in the Turkmen prisons (ICG, 2003a researchers turned to the analysis of frames that mediate the impact of various background conditions on people's decisions. Frames render specific understanding of solutions to individuals' grievances, and provide the rationale needed to encourage support for radical Islamic groups (Benford and Snow, 2000; Chandler, 2005) .
Socio-economic and political difficulties are ubiquitous across Central Asia (see Table 2 ). High unemployment rates, poverty, and shrinking welfare coupled with the lack of opportunities and poor governance can serve as a breeding ground for radical Islamic movements. Yet, the socio-economic and political distress is neither necessary nor sufficient condition for explaining the spread of radical Islam. Radical Islamic groups can emerge under conditions of social dislocation and economic stagnation. Islamists can also appear in the societies that are relatively developed socio-economically (Hafez, 2003; Naumkin, 2005: 22) . There has been lack of evidence that convincingly demonstrates the existence of a relationship between various indicators of the levels of development and political depravation, on one side, and the rise of radical Islam and terrorism, on the other (see, for example, Hafez, 2003; Krueger and Maleckova, 2003; Piazza, 2006 too, the patterns of poverty distribution do not square well with the patterns characterizing the spread of radical Islam (see Table 2 ) (World Bank, 2004 ).
[ Table 2 here]
There is no hard evidence that the provision of monetary rewards by Islamists is the primary reason for joining. Even if the recruits receive payments, it is very unlikely that many would risk their personal security and freedom for small financial benefits (ICG, 2003b) . The Uzbek and Tajik minorities hold acute social, political, and economic grievances over persistent discrimination. However, the mere existence of deprivations is not enough to cause them join the radical Islamic groups. To induce participation in the high risk activities of radical Islamic groups, individuals have to be persuaded that the cause they choose to support is worth the perils and costs of involvement (Wiktorowicz, 2004a: 7) . The ability of radical Islamic groups to convince individuals to join depends not only on the structure of political opportunities Omelicheva, Mariya Y. Ethnic Dimension of Religious Extremism and Terrorism in Central Asia, International Political Science Review, 2010 31(2): 167-186. Publisher's Official Version: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0192512110364738>. Open Access Version: <http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/>. and resource availability, but also their ability to frame their appeals in such a way that they resonate with the prospective members (Chandler, 2005) .
Poverty, discrimination, and other kinds of distress are important in that they compel people to seek out and embrace alternative views on the nature and causes of their problems. In the absence of other viable means of expressing dissent and affecting change, people can turn to radical Islamic groups that provide easy answers and simple solutions to social and individual concerns. Whether the movement's message will reach the targeted audience depends on the people's receptiveness to broad religious declarations. Those individuals who have had prior Islamic experiences are typically more receptive to the movement's religious appeals (Wiktorowicz, 2004a) .
The stronger an individual's identity is tied to Islam, the greater the likelihood that he or she will seek further exposure to Islamic teachings and become involved in the discussion and exchange of ideas over religious meanings and alternative ways of viewing the world (Wiktorowicz, 2004a: 8) . The ability of an Islamic group to frame this debate in such a way that it resonates with the listeners' experiences of discrimination and deprivation, as well as their Muslim identity, will determine success of its recruiting efforts. Once the frame alignment is achieved, i.e., individuals accept the group's interpretations and solutions to the pending problems, they become more committed to its cause through participation in a variety of micro-and macro-mobilization activities, which can include study groups, independent readings, one-on-one discussions of Islam, as well various types of non-violent and violent action.
Repression by the state will affect the structure of political opportunities of the Islamist groups. Yet, the nature of the relationship between state sanctions and dissent Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the two republics that had been subjected to intense
Russification as a consequence of the influx of Russians. There, the public authorities and some ordinary people have been ready to embrace Islam as a part of the greater ethnic idea, and to assert a local identity against the Russians who had long overshadowed the local cultural life (Khalid, 2007: 119) .
In a nutshell, the differences in the prior socialization experiences with Islam exposed Uzbek and Tajik Muslims to radical Islamic teachings. The "cognitive opening"
prompted by the socio-economic and political crises made them more receptive to radical Islamic calls that are typically framed so as to resonate with people's personal and social problems. The extensive social and religious networks and a system of religious institutions have also enabled the outreach by Islamists. 
Conclusion
The goals of this research were to demonstrate the differences in the ethnic make-up of various forms of ethnic discrimination is an unacceptable move that will stir up hostility toward the governing regimes rather than lay foundation for stability in the region. 
